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INTRODUCTION

Consider this hypothetical scenario: a national car seller implements an algorithmic decision-making system to raise profits by ten
percent in the next year. The algorithm will target the most competitive geographic market for a particular vehicle, recommend a price,
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and screen consumers for creditworthiness. The algorithm is immensely successful, and the corporation achieves its goal for increased
profits. But a disturbing trend emerges when multiple consumers file
lawsuits alleging discriminatory practices. Consumers claim that the
corporation gave Black borrowers with otherwise equal credentials
less favorable loan terms than white borrowers. Barred from bringing
suit by a contractual arbitration provision and class action waiver, the
consumers take to the media. In turn, shareholders demand transparency and ultimately file suit alleging securities fraud under the
Securities Exchange Act.1
This fact pattern may be a familiar one. It is analogous to algorithmic discrimination in fintech,2 employee hiring,3 and consumer
data privacy.4 Consumers themselves face hurdles and contractual
bars to bringing suit,5 and the enforcement agencies struggle to keep
pace with advances in technology.6 Securities regulations present a
final check on the untethered use of algorithmic decision-making.
With modest development, securities laws can provide transparency
and enforcement to deter inappropriate use of algorithmic decision
systems in the corporate context. This Comment proposes three concepts to enable that development: modernize Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) disclosure requirements, adapt the scienter and
causation elements in securities fraud claims, and create a United
States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) and SEC working
group.
1. Securities Exchange Act (Exchange Act) of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78m.
2. See Jennifer Miller, Is an Algorithm Less Racist Than a Loan Officer?, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 18, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/18/business/digital-mortgages.html [https://perma.cc/FE5J-WPU7].
3. See Alina Kochling & Marius C. Wehner, Discriminated by an Algorithm: A Systematic Review of Discrimination and Fairness by Algorithmic Decision-Making
in the Context of HR Recruitment and HR Development, 13 BUS. RES. 795 (2020),
http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/S40685-020-00134-w.pdf [https://
perma.cc/47MA-5ZF8].
4. See In re Facebook, Inc. Sec. Litig., 405 F. Supp. 3d 809 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (explaining how the political consulting firm, Cambridge Analytica, collected millions of
Facebook users’ data without consent).
5. See Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 2016) (upholding arbitration
agreements and class action waivers as a condition of employment). But see California Consumer Privacy Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.192 (West 2020) [hereinafter CCPA] (“[a]ny provision of a contract or agreement of any kind that purports
to waive or limit in any way a consumer’s rights under this title [the CCPA],
including, but not limited to, any right to a remedy or means of enforcement” is
“void and unenforceable”).
6. Although the Federal Trade Commission has been slow to react to the potential
harms resulting from algorithmic systems, they have taken recent steps to improve that response. See Elisa Jillson, Aiming for Truth, Fairness, and Equity in
Your Company’s Use of AI, FED. TRADE COMM’N BUS. BLOG (Apr. 19, 2021, 9:43
AM), https://www.ftc.gov/business-guidance/blog/2021/04/aiming-truth-fairnessequity-your-companys-use-ai [https://perma.cc/L4ZW-9X5E].
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After scoping the problem in this introduction, this Comment proceeds in three parts. Part II evaluates corporate reliance on algorithmic decision-making. Parts III and IV take a critical look at how
corporate filing requirements under the Exchange Act have adapted,
or not adapted, to algorithmic decision-making. Part V proposes a new
approach to advance the policy goals of the Exchange Act. I conclude
with a proposal that corporations should disclose these risks in SEC
filings now rather than wait for legislation. More realistically, Congress and the SEC should consider updating the SEC’s regulations.
II. CORPORATE RELIANCE ON ALGORITHMIC DECISIONMAKING
Algorithmic decision-making is a broad term intended to encompass machine learning and artificial intelligence systems that use
data to recommend courses of action.7 At its basic level, algorithmic
systems find correlations in a set of training data and optimize
processes based on user-defined target parameters.8 Some systems
continue to evolve when they are in operation or use powerful transfer
learning techniques to improve performance.9 In many cases, algorithmic decision-making systems can optimize business methods
more effectively than humans. Corporations were quick to adopt the
technology. But as these systems evolve, they sometimes perpetuate
or exacerbate human biases that were “baked in” to the code; the systems might proceed outside the bounds of normative behavior. Thus, a
problem emerges: if algorithms are employed to optimize a decision,
they can make decisions without explaining or justifying the process.
And it may have arrived at that decision using correlations that exacerbate historical discrimination. Whether the decision optimizes profits, for example, is irrelevant if it does so through discrimination.
Few, if any, business sectors avoid using algorithmic decision-making, but some embrace it more than others. Customer relationship
management companies use algorithmic decision-making to deliver a
predictive customer experience and optimize profits—some predict
customer needs before the customer is even aware of those needs.10
Real estate advertisers leverage artificial intelligence algorithms to
7. For a full treatment of the legal implications of machine learning on the artificial
intelligence field, see David Lehr & Paul Ohm, Playing with the Data: What Legal
Scholars Should Learn About Machine Learning, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 653
(2017).
8. Id. at 668–70.
9. Jason Brownlee, A Gentle Introduction to Transfer Learning for Deep Learning,
MACH. LEARNING MASTERY (Sept. 16, 2019), https://machinelearningmastery.com/
transfer-learning-for-deep-learning/ [https://perma.cc/Y4J9-6HBA].
10. Salesforce Einstein, SALESFORCE, https://www.salesforce.com/products/einstein/
features/ [https://perma.cc/JQF7-APB6] (last visited May 18, 2021).
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micro-target ads based on inferences about consumers.11 Banks and
lenders use algorithmic decision-making as an alternative to FICO
credit scores to predict creditworthiness.12 Health care networks use
machine learning algorithms to recommend medical diagnoses and
treatments.13 Human resource firms use algorithmic decision-making
to recommend hiring and firing decisions for “organizational optimization.”14 School systems use algorithmic systems to predict when interventions could prevent students from dropping out.15 Algorithmic
systems make decisions that are equivalent in weight to the decisions
made by corporate executives.
Algorithmic decision-making systems are effective because they
can identify correlations that are too complicated for humans to identify, but that can also introduce hidden flaws. In complex applications
like climate change, cancer treatment, and economics, algorithmic decision-making systems have led to huge breakthroughs.16 But the very
reason these systems are so effective also makes them dangerous.
Take, for example, predictive policing. In the early 2010s, police forces
from Los Angeles to New York embraced new technology that could
predict when and where a crime would occur.17 But these algorithms
had a fatal flaw that was unknown to the police officers using them.18
11. Facebook, Inc., FHEO No. 01-18-0323-8 (Mar. 28, 2019), https://www.hud.gov/
sites/dfiles/Main/documents/HUD_v_Facebook.pdf [https://perma.cc/4666-XL45
(charging Facebook with discriminatory housing practices for using user data to
microtarget ads based on protected classes).
12. CFPB Announces First No-Action Letter to Upstart Network, CONSUMER FIN.
PROT. BUREAU NEWSROOM (Sept. 14, 2017), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/
about-us/newsroom/cfpb-announces-first-no-action-letter-upstart-network/
[https://perma.cc/XCW4-R9WU].
13. See Thomas Grote & Philipp Berens, On the Ethics of Algorithmic Decision-Making in Healthcare, J. MED. ETHICS, 205 (2020), https://jme.bmj.com/content/
medethics/46/3/205.full.pdf [https://perma.cc/8TUW-QTPD].
14. See Kochling & Wehner, supra note 3, at 795–96.
15. CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH, ALGORITHMIC SYSTEMS IN EDUCATION: INCORPORATING EQUITY AND FAIRNESS WHEN USING STUDENT DATA 4 (Aug. 2019), https://
cdt.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/2019-08-08-Digital-Decision-making-BriefFINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/7RVJ-C233].
16. Kelsey Tsipsis, Machine Learning Identifies Links Between World’s Oceans, MIT
NEWS (Mar. 20, 2019), https://news.mit.edu/2019/machine-learning-identifieslinks-between-world-oceans-0320 [https://perma.cc/398T-35TM] (climate change);
Jessica Kent, Deep Learning Identifies Best Treatments for Lung Cancer Patients, HEALTH IT ANALYTICS (Oct. 19, 2020), https://healthitanalytics.com/news/
deep-learning-identifies-best-treatments-for-lung-cancer-patients [https://
perma.cc/7Q3H-HDLC] (cancer treatment); Sendhil Mullainathan & Jann Spiess,
Machine Learning: An Applied Econometric Approach, 31 J. ECON. PERS. 87, 103
(2017) (economics).
17. Caroline Haskins, Dozens of Cities Have Secretly Experimented with Predictive
Policing Software, VICE (Feb. 6, 2019, 9:00 AM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/d3m7jq/dozens-of-cities-have-secretly-experimented-with-predictive-policingsoftware [https://perma.cc/7GSE-NNWK].
18. Id.
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The algorithms used seismic models to predict future crimes based on
previous arrests.19 Previous arrests were a poor proxy for future crime
because they disparaged neighborhoods with a history of crime, thus
embedding racial and socioeconomic biases into the algorithm.20 Police had no role in developing the system and had little control over its
operation.21 Driven by discrimination lawsuits, virtually all police departments discontinued use of the systems.22 While the predictions
frequently led to arrests, the problem was that those arrests reproduced racial biases by “polic[ing] . . . ethnic minority neighbourhoods
[sic] at double the rate of white neighbourhoods [sic].”23
Bias and discrimination caused by algorithmic systems are
problems in the corporate context, too. In the U.S. credit market, algorithmic decision-making was supposed to “fix” discrimination. Not
only did it perpetuate discrimination, it made it harder to spot.24
While systems designed to recommend interventions for school children had some success, that success came with a significant cost to
children’s privacy.25 Microtargeting of real estate advertisements similarly found proxies for race, sex, and other protected classes and perpetuated housing discrimination by only making certain
advertisements available to consumers with certain characteristics.26
While many of these systems achieved their target metric of profitability, they did so in an unlawful or simply immoral manner.
Optimization variables are a key factor that sets the trajectory of
an algorithmic system. In many cases, third parties develop the algorithmic systems, or corporations buy them off-the-shelf. If set to optimize a particular metric—profit, for example—the system will take
a training data set and get to work. But software engineers, corporate
19. In the same way that shock waves ripple across the earth’s surface following an
earthquake, these models showed how arrests occurred in geographic proximity
to prior arrests. See Deirdre Mulligan & Kenneth Bamberger, Procurement as
Policy: Administrative Process for Machine Learning, 34 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
773, 802–03 (2019).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Avi Asher-Schapiro, In a U.S. First, California City Set To Ban Predictive Policing, REUTERS (June 17, 2020, 12:29 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usapolice-tech-trfn/in-a-u-s-first-california-city-set-to-ban-predictive-policingidUSKBN23O31A [https://perma.cc/Z8UM-3VJ5]; Haskins, supra note 17.
23. Asher-Schapiro, supra note 22.
24. Talia B. Gillis & Jann L. Spiess, Essay, Big Data and Discrimination, 86 U. CHI.
L. REV. 459, 459 (2019) (discussing how simply excluding data about race and
gender failed to minimize discrimination against Black and Hispanic borrowers
because the machine learning algorithms identify proxies for race and gender and
use historical data to predict creditworthiness); see also Facebook, Inc., supra
note 11 (charging Facebook with discriminatory housing practices for using user
data to microtarget ads based on protected classes).
25. CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH, supra note 15, at 13–14.
26. Facebook, Inc., supra note 11
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leaders, and humans in general struggle to set the right optimization
metrics.27 As described above, arrests are a problematic metric for
crime. Similarly, re-arrest rate is a bad proxy for recidivism. In the
corporate context, optimization for profit can overpower important
metrics for stability and long-term growth.28
“Explainable AI” seeks to solve this problem by asking the algorithm to explain how it arrived at a decision.29 But explainable AI is
not a panacea. As professors Deirdre Mulligan and Kenneth Bamberger acknowledge, there is a difference between explaining the decision and justifying it.30 And when algorithms evolve while making
critical decisions without a human in the decision-making loop, post
hoc justifications might be too late. Software developers sometimes
disfavor explainable AI, arguing that their product’s job is simply to
find correlations rather than causation.31 But for this argument to
hold water, the underlying training data needs to be perfect; it cannot
have baked-in biases. Otherwise, the algorithm will identify correlations that perpetuate the biases baked into the training data and, perhaps, the source code itself. And scholars agree that perfect training
data is a white whale.32
The bias conundrum is not just a problem in the corporate sector;
the government faces similar challenges. The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) implemented an algorithmic system to
identify fraud and misuse in the food stamp program.33 The system
revoked a store’s eligibility after flagging suspicious purchases.34 Investigative reporter Florangela Davila uncovered the reason: East African immigrant women shopped in groups and had certain
purchasing tendencies that raised flags in the system.35 For example,
they would purchase large quantities of Halal meat by the dollar
amount, not by the pound.36 So, a string of three or four $100
27. Rachel Thomas & David Uminsky, Reliance on Metrics Is a Fundamental Challenge for AI, ARXIV (FEB. 20, 2020), https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/2002/
2002.08512.pdf [https://perma.cc/L7AD-N29K] (unpublished conference paper).
28. Id. at 2.
29. For a thorough explanation of explainable AI versus unexplainable AI, see
Wojciech Samek & Klaus-Robert Müller, Towards Explainable Artificial Intelligence, in LECTURE NOTES IN COMPUT. SCI., EXPLAINABLE AI: INTERPRETING, EXPLAINING AND VISUALIZING DEEP LEARNING 5 (Wojciech Samek et al. eds., 2019).
30. Mulligan & Bamberger, supra note 19, at 787.
31. Id.
32. Carolin Kemper, Kafkaesque AI? Legal Decision-Making in the Era of Machine
Learning, 24 U.S.F. INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 251, 255 (2020) (discussing how
“overfitting” an algorithm with too much training data can cause problems, but
too little training data can introduce bias).
33. Mulligan & Bamberger, supra note 19, at 798.
34. Id. at 798–99.
35. Id. at 799.
36. Id.

980

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 100:974

purchases within a few minutes raised a flag. Unfortunately, the
USDA made its decision to revoke the store’s eligibility without any
further investigation.37 Professors Mulligan and Bamberger effectively argue in favor of utilizing the administrative process as the
cure—in procuring the algorithmic system, operating the system, and
adjudicating agency action.38
III. EXISTING TRANSPARENCY TOOLS AND THEIR
SHORTCOMINGS
“The only good is knowledge and the only evil is ignorance” –
Socrates
Transparency in algorithmic decision-making is critical to better
understand how corporations make decisions and to hold them accountable. In the same way that corporate executives justify their actions to a board of directors and shareholders, decisions relying on
algorithms should be held to similar standards of transparency. Especially since algorithmic decisions stand to cause unforeseen consequences, transparency is the best approach, even when the algorithms
produce generally favorable results. But today, there are few sources
for transparency. Indeed, corporations tend to shroud incidents of algorithmic discrimination behind layers of bureaucracy.39
A.

Existing Transparency Tools

In some applications, intellectual property rights provide transparency. For example, publicly available patent applications led to the
disclosure that Clearview AI ignored a court order and developed facial recognition technology for commercial and law enforcement applications.40 But when journalists or privacy advocates press companies
to explain how they will implement dystopian patents, they typically
37. Id.
38. Id. at 800.
39. See Decision Machines Project, BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM, https://
www.thebureauinvestigates.com/projects/decision-machines [https://perma.cc/
5CN5-2938] (last visited May 18, 2021).
40. See Caroline Haskins et al., A Clearview AI Patent Application Describes Facial
Recognition for Dating and Identifying People Who Are Unhoused or Use Drugs,
BUZZFEED NEWS (Feb. 11, 2021, 4:07 PM), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/
carolinehaskins1/facial-recognition-clearview-patent-dating [https://perma.cc/
Q63J-KFPE]; Thornley v. Clearview AI, Inc., 984 F.3d 1241 (7th Cir. 2021); see
also Christina Lamoureux, Clearview AI Plans To Take Its BIPA Challenge over
Standing to the Supreme Court, NAT’L L. REV. (Feb. 24, 2021), https://
www.natlawreview.com/article/breaking-news-clearview-ai-plans-to-take-itsbipa-challenge-over-standing-to-supreme [https://perma.cc/Z7S2-DAKN]
(describing Clearview AI’s petition for a stay of the Seventh Circuit’s mandate
during the pendency of the company’s petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court).
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balk.41 Corporations might file patents to block competitors, reserve
technology for the future, or myriad other reasons. But when an algorithmic system is disclosed in a patent, that patent is a powerful
transparency tool and serves an important function.
The underlying purpose of patent law, enshrined in the Constitution, is to “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”42 To
that end, patent law seeks to encourage innovation by rewarding the
fruits of labor with a limited monopoly while simultaneously disclosing inventions for others to build on.43 Algorithmic decision-making
systems fall on the outer edge of patentable subject matter. The Supreme Court interpreted 32 U.S.C. § 101 in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank to
mean that algorithms are patentable if implemented in a transformative way and do not block others from using fundamental principles.44
They are not patentable in the abstract.45 Modern innovations in AI
complicate this analysis, but commentators generally agree that a
more expansive interpretation of patentable subject matter furthers
the important policy goal of promoting innovation.46
Applied to the area of algorithmic decision-making, patentability
promotes innovation in three important ways. First, it allows other
inventors to learn from the prior art and make improvements. Second,
it rewards the inventor with a limited monopoly. Third, though there
is no consensus on this point, it promotes transparency. Opponents of
patentability for algorithmic decision-making systems argue that systems are difficult to build but easy to copy.47 Nevertheless, algorithmic system inventors typically seek patent protection, and the
USPTO tends to grant it.
To use patents as transparency tools, journalists and researchers
attempt to (1) identify the patented technology, (2) show that the corporation is using the technology, and (3) use disclosures in the patent
to show how the algorithm might have unintended negative consequences. This analysis typically breaks down at step two because of
the difficulty of showing that the corporation uses the technology. A
patent “working requirement” requires making or using the invention
41. See Body Chip, U.S. Patent No. 7777631B2 (filed Apr. 29, 2007); see also Ceylan
Yeginsu, If Workers Slack Off, the Wristband Will Know. (And Amazon Has a
Patent for It.), N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/01/
technology/amazon-wristband-tracking-privacy.html [https://perma.cc/L2PVATRE] (detailing how Amazon uses patented haptic-feedback devices to monitor
warehouse employees).
42. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
43. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc. 489 U.S. 141, 146–47 (1989).
44. Alice Corp. Proprietary Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 217 (2014).
45. Id. at 226.
46. Daniel Taylor, Comment, Down the Rabbit Hole: Who Will Stand Up for Software
Patents After Alice?, 68 ME. L. REV. 217, 230 (2016).
47. See MARTIN ADELMAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW 111 (5th ed.
2018).
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as a condition of holding the patent.48 The U.S. does not have a working requirement and except for a brief period in the 1830s, never
has.49 A policy goal of a working requirement is to ensure that companies produce and patent technology in the same county. Indeed, in medieval times in Great Britain, the King granted patents to foreigners if
they would stay in Great Britain and “teach their arts to those willing
to learn.”50 This practice fell out of favor during the rise of disclosure
requirements.51 Currently, most countries require disclosure of the
technology sufficient to enable a person of ordinary skill in the art to
make, use, or otherwise practice the patented technology.
A working requirement would certainly reveal when a corporation
uses a patented technology, but imposing that requirement would disrupt the U.S. patent system and put it at odds with the rest of the
world. Instead, perhaps the SEC could help bridge the gap. The SEC’s
website has a useful tool to find recent patents filed by a particular
corporation. Conceivably, watchdogs could use the tool to find problematic patents, but they would still have to find a source to correlate
that technology with a corporate practice. Corporate disclosures
could—and should—be that source, but the current practice means
most corporate disclosures are too broad to provide actionable information in this regard.
Trademarks can be effective transparency tools in some contexts.52
Trademark law has a working requirement—although it is called an
in use requirement—thus, the mark has to be in commercial use to be
valid.53 However, the subject matter eligible for trademark protection
is limited and does not include algorithmic decision systems.
B.

Securities Law as a Transparency Tool

Shareholders of publicly traded companies present one last check
on unfair practices, as even a powerhouse technology company like
Amazon will pull back on questionable technology at the behest of its
shareholders.54 Nevertheless, shareholders can only respond to
known risks. Currently, shareholders only become aware of negative
48. Marketa Trimble, Patent Working Requirements: Historical and Comparative
Perspectives, 6 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 483, 484 (2016).
49. Id. at 488.
50. Id. (quoting ERNEST LUNGE, COMPULSORY WORKING AND REVOCATION OF PATENTS
2 (1910)).
51. Id. at 498.
52. Amanda Levendowski, Trademarks as Surveillance Transparency, 36 BERKELEY
TECH. L. J. 439, 439 (2021).
53. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1051(a).
54. See Todd R. Weiss, Amazon Apologizes for Price Testing Program that Angered
Customers, COMPUTERWORLD (Sept. 28, 2000, 12:00 AM), https://www.computer
world.com/article/2588337/amazon-apologizes-for-price-testing-program-that-an
gered-customers.html [https://perma.cc/R5UG-UJDJ].
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consequences associated with algorithmic decision-making after the
fact and are rarely apprised of their associated risks beforehand.55
Congress enacted the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange
Act) to promote corporate transparency following discontent over corruption that contributed to the Great Depression.56 The Act requires
publicly traded corporations to file quarterly and annual reports to the
SEC, which are available to the public.57 The purpose of these disclosures, among other things, is to identify risks so that shareholders can
make informed decisions about their investments.58 Under the Exchange Act,59 publicly held securities and companies of a certain size
must file annual reports—Form 10-K—and quarterly reports—Form
8-K.60 Of importance here, 17 C.F.R. § 229.105 requires disclosure of
risk factors that “make an investment in the registrant or offering
speculative or risky.”61 A sample of 10-K reports from tech companies
shows the vast difference in reporting risks.62
There is no consensus concerning what risks corporations have to
report, but they consistently tend to report certain categories of risk.
The most apparent example is cybersecurity risk.63 Virtually every
major company includes cybersecurity risks in their 10-K reports.64
Perhaps these disclosures were meaningful at one time, but they have
55. This is clear because of the lack of shareholder calls for action in the absence of
reporting of negative consequences. See, e.g., Rebecca Klar, Google Pressed To
Conduct Racial Equity Audit, THE HILL (April 28, 2021, 1:23 PM), https://
thehill.com/policy/technology/550723-google-pressed-to-conduct-racial-equity-audit [https://perma.cc/EE29-GX9L] (calling for action after widespread reporting
that lack of diversity at Google contributed to algorithmic bias on YouTube).
56. JACK ELLENBERGER & ELLEN MAHAR, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES
ACT OF 1933 AND SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, at ix (1973) (published for
the Law Librarians’ Society of Washington, D.C.).
57. Securities Exchange Act (Exchange Act) of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78m. The statute
may also be referred to as the 1934 Act.
58. ELLENBERGER & MAHAR, supra note 56.
59. 15 U.S.C. § 78a–99.
60. Since this Comment focuses on a critical application of the Exchange Act, SEC
regulations, and related case law, the Comment does not fully present the regulatory requirements related to SEC filings. For more in-depth treatment of the issue, see TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION, 79A C.J.S. Securities
Regulation § 93 (2019).
61. 17 C.F.R. § 229.105 (2019).
62. Compare Salesforce, Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Mar. 17, 2021), with Amazon,
Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 2, 2021).
63. Edward A. Morse et al., SEC Cybersecurity Guidelines: Insights into the Utility of
Risk Factor Disclosures for Investors, 73 BUS. LAW. 1 (2018).
64. Grace F. Johnson, Examining Cybersecurity Risk Reporting on US SEC Form 10K, ISACA J., Sept. 2018, at 3 (100% of the thirty-three companies examined from
the S&P 100 Index in 2016 included “consequences of undetected incidents” as a
risk in their 10-K reports).
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deteriorated into a complicated web of boilerplate language that
means little to a prospective investor.65
The Exchange Act provides two causes of action that shareholders
or the SEC can bring to deter dishonesty.66 But over time, corporation-friendly court decisions have created a high pleading standard for
plaintiffs that dilutes the ability of shareholders to bring suit.67 If a
corporation fails to disclose a significant risk or knowingly conceals a
risk, either the SEC or shareholders could bring actions under § 10(b)
for fraud and § 18 for misrepresentation. Generally, § 10(b) lawsuits
arise more frequently because of that section’s broader application
and plaintiff-friendly damages calculation.68 However, § 18 claims
need not satisfy the heightened pleading requirement for fraud claims
under § 10(b).69 Therefore, both claims have an important and distinct
role.
Despite the noble goals of the Exchange Act, disclosure requirements have fallen short of their target, particularly regarding disclosures of risk. As a heavily litigated area, corporations learned to
disclose certain categories of risk broadly while glossing over pertinent details that investors need to make informed decisions. To address this, the SEC recently updated 17 C.F.R. § 229.105 for the first
time in thirty years.70 The Commission’s goal was to account for new
technological developments and improve the readability of disclosure
documents. In pertinent part, § 229.105 now requires a two-page bullet-point summary. The amendment seeks a “principles-based disclosure framework” rather than imposing prescriptive categories.71
While that might be the intent, it fails to meet the needs of investors
since it does not require entities to disclose whether and to what degree they rely on algorithmic systems or how coders developed those
systems.

65. Id. at 5 (showing a trend toward vague or general disclosure of cybersecurity
risks rather than specific risks).
66. The avenues for relief are found in §§ 10(b) and 18 of the Act.
67. Christopher J. Hardy, Comment, The PSLRA’s Heightened Pleading Standard:
Does Severe Recklessness Constitute Scienter?, 35 U.S.F. L. REV. 565 (2001).
68. Peter M. Saparoff, Five Advantages to Section 18 of the Securities Act – A New
Weapon for Institutions, NAT’L L. REV. (Sept. 29, 2015), https://www.natlawre
view.com/article/five-advantages-to-section-18-securities-act-new-weapon-insti
tutions#google_vignette [https://perma.cc/D2BM-4C8J].
69. Id.
70. Modernization of Regulation S-K Items 101, 103, and 105, 85 Fed. Reg. 63726
(Oct. 8, 2020) (codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 229, 239 & 240).
71. Id. at 63754.
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IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS OF FRAUD AND MISLEADING CLAIMS
UNDER THE EXCHANGE ACT
To illustrate how suits would proceed under the Exchange Act, consider the hypothetical scenario from the Introduction, described in
greater detail here.
A reputable AI software development company provides an algorithmic decision-making system to ABC Corporation. The software
company offers two packages: one-time purchase and software as a
service (SaaS). For both packages, the software company designs and
builds a software package to analyze data inputs provided by ABC
Corporation. The software includes “deep learning,” meaning will
evolve and learn based on the data inputs and desired outputs. The
SaaS package provides ongoing support to fine-tune the software to
support the customer’s goals and fix any unexpected issues. ABC Corporation purchased the one-time purchase package and told the
software developers to maximize profits in its resale division and minimize risk in its consumer lending division.
Executives plan to blindly implement the system’s recommendations over a one-year period to see if its recommendations are more
profitable than ABC Corporation’s traditional pricing structure. In
ABC Corporation’s 10-K report, executives claim, “We are embarking
on a bold plan to optimize profits in our car sales and consumer lending divisions. We expect to see a ten percent increase in profits over
last year.” In the risk section of the 10-K, there is no mention of the
algorithmic decision-making system and simply a general stipulation
about market risks.
Six months into the trial period, ABC Corporation’s profits exceeded their expectations. However, the corporation recognized a
strange trend: Black consumers routinely complained that they did
not qualify for loans, and the car prices in low-income communities
were higher than in wealthy communities. Executives were puzzled
but continued to use the platform because of the impressive profits.
The relationship between ABC Corporation and the software development company soured after ABC Corporation realized that its data
team could not manipulate the proprietary platform. The software development company refused to help unless ABC Corporation purchased the significantly more expensive SaaS option. Nevertheless,
ABC Corporation continued to use the software and ignored the complaints from Black consumers.
ABC Corporation’s Q1 8-K report highlighted the monumental success of the “bold plan to optimize profits,” claiming that it now projects
that it will exceed the previous year’s profits by fifteen percent. In the
risk section, ABC noted, “our new lending policies have attracted a
number of nuisance arbitration actions alleging discrimination. Our
top-flight data team is working closely with our compliance team to
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ensure compliance with our corporate nondiscrimination policy. The
arbitration actions will be handled swiftly and fairly through our partnership with ABC Arbitrators.”
The issue arising in this hypothetical is the same under § 10(b),
fraud, or § 18, misleading claims: whether it is deceptive to omit the
key fact that the “bold new plan” is actually the use of an algorithmic
decision-making system. The analysis differs if the suit is an SEC enforcement action or a shareholder lawsuit; the SEC does not have to
prove reliance on a statement or damages in a claim of fraud.72 Thus,
to prove a claim of fraud under § 10(b), the SEC must show that there
was (1) material misrepresentations or materially misleading omissions, (2) in the offer or sale of securities, (3) made with scienter.73
While there are numerous SEC enforcement actions for fraud
under § 10(b), there are very few specifically for failing to disclose
risks in 10-K or 8-K reports.74 Part of the reason could be artificial:
SEC enforcement actions that occur wholly within the agency are not
searchable in its database.75 Another possibility is that the SEC
might, as a policy matter, not prioritize enforcement actions for fraudulent misrepresentations of risks. Understandably, shareholders
would have better visibility in the absence of other fraudulent
behavior.
Analogizing algorithmic decision-making to traditional fraudulent
misrepresentation like that in Securities and Exchange Commission v.
True North Financial Corp. most likely would result in a dismissal. In
the hypothetical, the statement that ABC expected to see a ten percent increase in profits over last year because of the corporation’s plan
could violate § 10(b) if that statement knowingly misrepresented facts.
But courts have defined scienter in this context to mean manipulative
or deceptive conduct; courts limit manipulative conduct to certain
types of trading practices that would not apply here.76 Thus, the in72. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Morgan Keegan & Co., 678 F.3d 1233, 1244 (11th Cir.
2012).
73. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n. v. Merch. Cap., LLC, 483 F.3d 747, 766 (11th Cir. 2007).
74. See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. True N. Fin. Corp., 909 F. Supp. 2d 1073, 1087 (D.
Minn. 2012) (holding that the statement of executives of a property ownership
fund claiming a “risk of default” was a material misrepresentation made with
scienter since the two principal executives were already in default in the wake of
the 2008 financial crisis).
75. Commission Opinions and Adjudicatory Orders, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/opinions.htm [https://perma.cc/7S9G-27YY] (last
visited May 18, 2021). The databases list cases by party name and release number, but it is not internally searchable. Id.
76. Aaron v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 446 U.S. 680, 690–91, 694–95 (1980) (holding that
the scienter standard under Rule 10b-5 applies to both private suits and enforcement actions brought by the SEC); see also THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 626 (7th ed. 2016) (describing the evolution of
case law on interpreting Rule 10b-5’s scienter requirement).
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quiry would be whether the executives knew that omitting the details
of their “bold new plan” was deceptive.
Dismissal is likely because using an algorithmic decision system is
deceptive when executives know, before implementing the system,
that it will produce an unintended consequence. The SEC could argue
that it is deceptive to omit the fact that this new plan is the employment of an algorithmic decision-making system, but that would be a
major leap for a court of first impression. A more likely application of
§ 10(b) would require showing that executives knew that the algorithmic decision-making system would generate negative consequences. But given the complexities of algorithmic decision-making
systems, executives would not know about negative consequences until after implementing the system. The whole premise of algorithmic
decision-making systems is that they can identify correlations that
lead to “smarter” decisions that human operators are incapable of understanding.77 Since the executive’s optimism was genuine and could
not have been misleading until after the test period, the scienter element would not be satisfied in the hypothetical. Case dismissed.
If the hypothetical here cannot sustain an enforcement action
under § 10(b), the question turns to whether the SEC could successfully bring an action under § 18 of the Exchange Act.78 Liability for
misleading statements applies where a statement is “at the time and
in light of the circumstances under which it was made false or misleading with respect to any material fact.”79 Similar to fraud claims,
the plaintiff must show reliance on the statement in shareholder suits,
but courts do not require that showing in SEC proceedings.80 Unlike a
fraud claim, misleading claims do not require the plaintiff or the SEC
to show scienter.81 However, proof of good faith is an affirmative
defense.82
As a threshold matter, executives who rely on algorithmic decisionmaking systems are presumably always doing so in good faith. The
good faith defense will save the hypothetical executive here. But what
if the algorithmic decision-making system is a low-budget commercial
product using bad training data? Courts should require due diligence
77. P.J.G. Lisboa, Interpretability in Machine Learning—Principles and Practice, in
FUZZY LOGIC AND APPLICATIONS 15, 18 (Francesco Masulli et al. eds., 2013).
78. 15 U.S.C. § 78r; see Newby v. Enron Corp., 540 F. Supp. 2d 800, 812–17 (S.D. Tex.
2007) (interpreting 15 U.S.C. § 78r). Under 15 U.S.C. § 78r, the plaintiff must
show (1) that a document filed under the Exchange Act contained a false or misleading statement, (2) the plaintiff actually relied on the statement, and (3) the
reliance caused a loss to the plaintiff.
79. Newby, 540 F. Supp. 2d at 812–13.
80. See Donald C. Langevoort, Basic at Twenty: Rethinking Fraud on the Market,
2009 WIS. L. REV. 151, 157 (2009).
81. See U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Jensen, 835 F.3d 1100, 1114 n.6 (9th Cir. 2016).
82. Id. at 1121.
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in order to assert the good faith defense. Executives cannot operate
with willful blindness or deliberate indifference to the possibility that
their algorithmic system might create negative consequences.
In the hypothetical above, the executives initially acted in good
faith. Once they became aware of alleged disparate impact, however,
they were on notice that the algorithmic decision-making system perpetuated or even exacerbated discrimination. The SEC would have a
strong argument that following the Q1 8-K report, omitting the material fact that the discriminatory lending practices resulted from an algorithmic system was misleading. That the corporation continued to
refuse to pay for the SaaS package while using the platform means
that an enforcement action brought by the SEC would likely survive a
motion to dismiss. The disposition will turn on a fact-intensive inquiry, and, as a policy matter, the SEC might be hesitant to wade into
those waters altogether.
In the realm of private litigation, the good faith defense couples
with a heightened pleading requirement to create a high burden for
plaintiffs to survive a motion to dismiss.83 In response to a perceived
onslaught of shareholder class action lawsuits, Congress enacted the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act84 (PSLRA) to require plaintiffs to meet the heightened pleading requirements of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.85 Despite this high burden, class action suits
alleging fraud because of material misrepresentations in SEC disclo-

83. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1951); see also Loos v. Immersion Corp., 762 F.3d 880,
886–88 (9th Cir. 2014) (finding there are six elements to a securities fraud claim
under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 that must be present to survive a motion to dismiss:
“(1) a material misrepresentation or omission; (2) scienter (i.e. a wrongful state of
mind); (3) a connection between the misrepresentation and the purchase or sale
of a security; (4) reliance upon the misrepresentation . . . ; (5) economic loss; and
(6) loss causation” (citing Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341–42
(2005))).
84. PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM (PSLRA) ACT OF 1995, Pub. L. No.
104–67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995). The PSLRA was enacted to reduce a perceived onslaught of frivolous securities litigation. The Act requires: (1) pleading with particularity, (2) a strong inference of scienter, and (3) loss causation. Id. Congress
passed the Act in 1995 over a veto of President Clinton. Lisa Girion, 1995 Tort
Reform Act Said To Provide Safe Harbor for Fraud, L.A. TIMES (July 21, 2002,
12:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2002-jul-21-fi-suits21story.html [https://perma.cc/9GT6-GDFJ]. It was originally envisioned by House
Speaker Newt Gingrich during his pro-corporation “contract with America.” Id.
Many now believe the Act contributed to corporate fraud and allowed companies
to escape liability. Id.
85. See FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b); 15 U.S.C. § 78u–4(b)(1), (2); Dura Pharms., Inc. v.
Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 345 (2005) (explaining that plaintiffs that must “state with
particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with
the required state of mind”) (quoting 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u–4(b)(1), (2)).
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sures are relatively common.86 However, the disposition is typically
either settlement after certification or dismissal.87
The Facebook case demonstrates an extremely high burden on the
plaintiff class, even at the pleading stage, to allege fraudulent misrepresentation in a private lawsuit.88 Turning to our hypothetical, it is
unlikely that a shareholder class action lawsuit under § 10(b) could
survive a motion to dismiss. As in Facebook, here the executive knew
that the algorithmic decision-making system produced an unexpected
negative consequence but only highlighted the increase in profits.
However, all of the statements are forward-looking and if accompanied by cautionary statements, would fall into the safe harbor provision of PSLRA. Here, the excerpt about profit expectations does not
incorporate a cautionary statement, but the risk section does include a
general statement about market risks.
The same overconfidence that could lead an executive to tout the
prowess of an algorithmic decision-making system would provide
proof of good faith, to defeat a claim under § 18, and a lack of scienter,
to defeat a claim under § 10(b). This result follows because courts currently interpret scienter as the state of mind of the person making the
statement, not the state of mind of the programmer, developer, or the
algorithmic system. The only conceivable way to meet the scienter element would be if the executive knew that the algorithmic system was
flawed, in which case they probably would not make an overly confident statement in an SEC disclosure.
If shareholders were able to show scienter under § 10(b), the plaintiff would also have to show causation. Causation means a but-for connection between the alleged action and the drop in share price.89
Applied to the hypothetical, plaintiffs would have to show that the
“bold new plan” and associated arbitrations caused a drop in share
price. The more likely scenario is that the share price would rise,
driven by profits that exceeded even the executive’s ambitious predictions. In the realm of algorithmic decision-making systems specifically, and technology more broadly, causation is a difficult matter.
As currently interpreted by the courts, the Exchange Act is incapable of addressing concerns related to reliance on algorithmic decisionmaking systems. To make meaningful change, courts or Congress
86. See, e.g., In re Facebook, Inc. Sec. Litig., 405 F. Supp. 3d 809, 818 (N.D. Cal.
2019).
87. Id. at 832, 834, 847–49 (dismissing the case because the executive statements
downplaying the Cambridge Analytica scandal were protected by the PSLRA safe
harbor provision since they were accompanied by “meaningful cautionary statements” and because executives thought the issues had been fixed, so the scienter
element under § 10(b) was not met).
88. Id. at 832.
89. Langevoort, supra note 80, 173–81 (discussing the presumption that efficient
markets will react to “bad news”).
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should update the scienter and causation elements of § 10(b) and require due diligence to claim the good faith defense under § 18.
V. PROPOSAL FOR TRANSPARENCY INTO CORPORATE
RELIANCE ON ALGORITHMIC DECISION SYSTEMS
Change is needed to protect civil society from the unintended consequences of algorithmic decision-making systems, but it is important
to do so while not unnecessarily obstructing the uncontested benefits
from those systems. To promote that goal, this Comment proposes
three things. First, Congress and the SEC should modernize disclosure requirements under the Exchange Act. Second, courts or Congress should update the scienter and causation elements of fraud
claims under the Exchange Act. Third, Congress should mandate
meaningful interaction between the USPTO and the SEC to improve
corporate transparency while progressing the underlying purposes of
both intellectual property and securities law.
A.

Reform 10-K and 8-K Reports

Corporations should disclose reliance on algorithmic systems now
because algorithmic systems introduce risk that is material to business operations. Even a modest interpretation of 17 C.F.R. § 229.105
requires disclosure if algorithmic systems’ decisions are material, that
is, if they could adversely affect the corporation’s present or future
business expectations.90 Many corporations are already relying on algorithmic systems to make such decisions.91 They might argue that
the algorithmic systems only recommend business decisions and executives make the actual decisions. But that argument is flawed. If an
algorithmic system recommends a course of action and is unable to
justify its reasoning, then the material decision is the one the algorithm makes, not the thumbs-up or thumbs-down from executives.
This point about corporate decision-making is not a new issue that
arises only because of algorithmic decision systems. To illustrate this
point, imagine a scenario where an executive relies on recommendations from a team of in-house economists. When faced with questions
from the SEC or by shareholders, the executive would either learn the
intricacies of the reasoning or bring along one of the leading economists to articulate the reasoning. But either way, the executive is the
one who will be held accountable for the decision. In the context of
algorithmic decision-making, it is virtually impossible for an executive
90. Yan v. ReWalk Robotics Ltd., 973 F.3d 22, 33 (1st Cir. 2020).
91. See Mihailis E. Diamantis, The Extended Corporate Mind: When Corporations
Use AI To Break the Law, 98 N.C.L. REV. 893, 896 (2020) (discussing Vital, an
algorithm that was appointed to the board of Deep Knowledge Ventures and
helped it avoid bankruptcy by evaluating potential investments).
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to articulate the precise justification of the algorithm’s specific recommendation. The executive can only justify it by showing the underlying algorithmic system is sound. Therefore, it is material to the
decision-making process to disclose the use and reliability of an algorithmic system.
As demonstrated by disclosures related to cybersecurity, even if
corporations do disclose reliance on algorithms, without specific requirements from the SEC, they will likely do it in such an opaque
manner that it fails to inform potential investors. Instead, the SEC
should consider a return to prescriptive disclosure requirements. More
precisely, the SEC should require corporations to disclose the specific
patented technology that they rely on if those systems influence decisions that are material to business operations. Additional disclosure
about system maintenance, training data, and verification should be
required. Requirements like this could be incorporated by policy guidance, but rulemaking would be necessary to create meaningful
change.
Professors Mulligan and Bamberger proposed algorithmic impact
assessments as a novel method for disclosures related to algorithmic
systems in the government sector.92 They argue that government
agencies that use algorithmic decision-making systems should conduct an algorithmic impact assessment much in the same way that
government agencies conduct environmental impact assessments currently.93 The assessment would document a dialogue between the government agency and the software developer, showing target metrics,
training data, and how the vendor mitigated bias. The assessment
would be publicly available and serve as a testament to the agency’s
commitment to transparency.
The SEC should require an algorithmic impact assessment provision within 10-K disclosures under 17 C.F.R. § 229.105. This approach
addresses the key issues head-on since it prompts corporate executives to investigate, participate, and document the parameters within
which their algorithmic systems will operate. Although corporations
might scoff at the additional burden, it is work they should already be
doing. The minimal disclosure in a 10-K will not impact their competitive advantage or disclose trade secret information. Further, this solution provides clarity and predictability because it provides specific
requirements rather than adapting existing requirements on a decision-by-decision basis. Simply put, if a corporation uses an algorithmic
system to make material business decisions, it should be required to
complete an algorithmic impact assessment and disclose it to the SEC.
92. Mulligan & Bamberger, supra note 19, at 824, 835–38.
93. Id. at 836.
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Reevaluate the Scienter Element of Fraud Claims and
Good Faith Defense to Misleading Claims

A court applying existing precedent to evaluate scienter would look
at the state of mind of the executive who communicated the decision
that the algorithm made. But this analysis breaks down. The executive will not have the requisite state of mind if they implement a decision made by an algorithmic system unless they know that the system
is flawed. The troubling consequences of algorithmic systems are often
unforeseeable and take time to become apparent. Consider the example of consumer lending algorithmic systems that resulted in racially
biased lending practices.94 There, executives thought they were making well-informed decisions using the best data available. The scienter
element, even in the worst scenarios to date, has not been satisfied.95
Instead, the scienter element should evolve to become a question of
whether the corporation used due diligence to adopt the best available
technology, follow industry best practices, or establish a similar “reasonable corporation” standard. In effect, scienter analysis should look
at the state of mind of the executives during the acquisition, development, training, and operation of the algorithmic decision system.
Under this approach, a court would look at whether the corporation
inquired about diversity in the programmers behind the software,
what the training data set encompassed, and how the software provider and corporation would interact in the future to modify the system and correct for unforeseen consequences. Perhaps this analysis
would look at the algorithmic impact assessment recommended in the
previous section. If the corporation conducted an algorithmic impact
assessment, the assessment might say, for example, that each quarter
the corporation will evaluate results for discriminatory impact. A
court could consider that when evaluating scienter. Similarly, if the
corporation completed an assessment and followed its recommendations, then it would not meet the scienter element and could claim the
good faith defense when defending a claim under § 18.
In the hypothetical proposed above, this new standard would allow
a private litigant, or the SEC, to meet the scienter element since ABC
Corporation did not adequately correct for biases nor did it establish a
mechanism for correcting the issue. A private litigant would still have
to prove causation and reliance to the heightened standard required
under the PSLRA, but at least the claim would have a chance to proceed beyond the motion to dismiss phase. The SEC would have a
94. See Miller, supra note 2.
95. Yavar Bathaee, The Artificial Intelligence Black Box and the Failure of Intent and
Causation, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 889, 913 (2018) (arguing that the predominant
“Effect Intent” test for scienter which “requires that a person intended the unlawful consequences of his action” is problematic when applied to algorithmic decision-making).
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strong claim under this new standard against ABC Corporation. In a
claim under § 18, this standard would preclude the good faith defense
since ABC Corporation knew about potential biases and failed to take
corrective action.
C.

Require Interagency Coordination Between the USPTO
and the SEC

Transparency about when and how a corporation relies on patented algorithmic decision systems promotes the policy goals of both
intellectual property and securities law. Since intellectual property
law seeks to disseminate information so that others can improve upon
existing inventions, it is valuable for inventors to know which patents
corporations rely on to make their most important business decisions.
Securities laws also seek transparency, but it values transparency as
a way to prevent corruption. Coordination between the USPTO and
the SEC could help both agencies achieve their goals while also incorporating much-needed transparency into algorithmic systems.
The missing element in current SEC disclosures is determining
which specific patents corporations rely on to make material business
decisions. A working group with representatives from both agencies
could easily find overlap and propose creative solutions to this problem. The SEC already links to the USPTO on its website, where it lists
patents held by a corporation.96 Admittedly, the SEC would have to
leverage its authority under 17 C.F.R. § 229.105 to get corporations to
identify those patents that the corporation relies on to make material
business decisions, but that aligns with the underlying purpose of the
Exchange Act and is far from arbitrary and capricious agency action.
Without cooperation between the two offices, the SEC alone might
miss the mark. The USPTO faces an abundance of challenges, and the
patentability of algorithmic systems is questionable. Some commentators believe there is an overabundance of patents issued by the
USPTO that have led to an excessively broad range of patentable material.97 Perhaps greater cooperation between the USPTO and the
SEC could work towards solving that problem too. Indeed, if corporations are required to flag the patents they use for material business
decisions, then the patents they do not use would be identified by virtue of not being flagged. Perhaps that could reveal trends that would
allow the USPTO to draw a finer distinction based on the utility of
algorithmic patents under § 101 rather than its current reliance on
patentable subject matter under § 101 and Alice.98
96. Commission Opinions and Adjudicatory Orders, supra note 75.
97. David S. Olson, Taking the Utilitarian Basis for Patent Law Seriously: The Case
for Restricting Patentable Subject Matter, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 181, 212 n.111 (2009).
98. Alice Corp. Proprietary Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208 (2014).
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CONCLUSION

Corporate decision-making that executives delegate to algorithms
creates risk. The foregoing proposals seek to protect civil society, and
the corporations themselves, from those risks. While corporations
should already be performing due diligence prior to adopting algorithmic decision systems, history shows that many do not. It is well
within the SEC’s authority to adapt its disclosure requirements. Simultaneously, Congress should act too. The Exchange Act serves the
purpose of informing investors of risks, but the Exchange Act has not
evolved to address the risks associated with state-of-the-art technology in the corporate context. The underlying policy goals of the SEC
align with the USPTO’s goals in this area, and perhaps greater collaboration between the two agencies will spur a solution. With the proposals recommended here, shareholders will get a slightly better
glimpse into the corporate decision-making process that will inform
their investment decisions and provide another layer of assurance
that algorithmic systems will not perpetuate bias and discrimination.

